Equilibrium concepts for time-inconsistent stopping problems in
  continuous time by Bayraktar, Erhan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
01
11
2v
1 
 [q
-fi
n.M
F]
  3
 Se
p 2
01
9
ON THE NOTIONS OF EQUILIBRIA FOR TIME-INCONSISTENT STOPPING
PROBLEMS IN CONTINUOUS TIME
ERHAN BAYRAKTAR, JINGJIE ZHANG, AND ZHOU ZHOU
Abstract. A new notion of equilibrium, which we call strong equilibrium, is introduced for time-
inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time. Compared to the existing notions introduced
in [4] and [3], which in this paper are called mild equilibrium and weak equilibrium respectively, a
strong equilibrium captures the idea of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium more accurately. When
the state process is a continuous-time Markov chain and the discount function is log sub-additive,
we show that an optimal mild equilibrium is always a strong equilibrium. Moreover, we provide a
new iteration method that can directly construct an optimal mild equilibrium and thus also prove
its existence.
1. Introduction
On a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,∞),P) consider an optimal stopping problem in
continuous time
sup
τ∈T
Ex[δ(τ)Xτ ], (1.1)
where X = (Xt)t∈[0,∞) is a time-homogeneous Markov process taking values in some space X ⊂ R,
T is a set of stopping times, δ is a discount function, and Ex is the expectation given X0 = x. It
is well known that when δ is not exponential, the problem (1.1) may be time-inconsistent. That
is, the optimal stopping strategy obtained today may not be optimal in the eyes of future selves.
One way to approach such time inconsistency is consistent planning (see [10]), which is formulated
as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: once an equilibrium strategy is enforced over the planning
horizon, the current self has no incentive to deviate from it, given all future selves will follow the
equilibrium strategy.
There are two general notions of equilibrium stopping strategies in continuous time in the liter-
ature. The first notion is proposed in [4] and further studied in [5, 7, 6], which we will call mild
equilibrium in this paper. Following [4, Definition 3.3] and [7, Definition 2.2], we have the following
definition of mild equilibrium.
Definition 1.1. A measurable set S ⊂ X is said to be a mild equilibrium, if{
x ≤ Ex[δ(τS)XτS ], ∀x /∈ S, (1.2)
x ≥ Ex[δ(τ
+
S )XτS ], ∀x ∈ S, (1.3)
where
τS := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ S}, and τ
+
S := inf{t > 0 : Xt ∈ S}. (1.4)
Key words and phrases. Time-inconsistency, optimal stopping, strong equilibria, weak equilibria, mild equilibria,
non-exponential discounting, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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In the above S is the stopping region, and the economic interpretation for Definition 1.1 is clear,
there is no incentive to deviate. That is, in (1.2) when x /∈ S, it is better to continue and get
Ex[δ(τS)XτS ], rather than to stop and get x; on the surface a similar statement applies to (1.3).
However, when the time of return for X is 0 (i.e., P(τ{x} = 0 |X0 = x) = 1), which is satisfied for
continuous-time Markov chain and many one-dimension diffusion processes, τS = τ
+
S and thus (1.3)
trivially holds. In other words, when the time of return is 0, there is no actual deviation captured
by (1.3) from stopping to continuing, and Definition 1.1 is equivalent to the following.
Definition 1.2. A measurable set S ⊂ X is said to be a mild equilibrium, if
x ≤ Ex[δ(τS)XτS ] =: J(x, S), ∀x /∈ S. (1.5)
Consequently, with the time of return being 0 the notion of mild equilibrium cannot fully capture
the economic meaning of equilibrium. It is easy to see that S = X is always a mild equilibrium,
and it is not clear why always stopping immediately is a reasonable strategy.
As can be seen from [4, 5, 7, 6], there is often a continuum of mild equilibria in many natural
models, which naturally leads to the question of equilibrium selection. In [7], optimal mild equilib-
rium in the sense of point-wise dominance is considered. In particular, from [7, Definition 2.3] we
have the following definition.
Definition 1.3. A mild equilibrium S∗ is said to be optimal, if for any other mild equilibrium S,
x ∨ J(x, S∗) ≥ x ∨ J(x, S)(⇐⇒ J(x, S∗) ≥ J(x, S)), ∀x ∈ X.
Note that x∨ J(x, S) represents the value associated with the stopping region/strategy S. In [7]
the existence of optimal equilibrium is established. A discrete-time version is in [8].
The second notion of equilibrium, which we call weak equilibrium in this paper, is proposed in
[3] and further investigated in [2]. Following [3], we have the definition of weak equilibrium (we
adapt the definition slightly for our setting).
Definition 1.4. A measurable set S ⊂ X is said to be a weak equilibrium, if
x ≤ Ex[δ(τS)XτS ], ∀x /∈ S,
lim inf
εց0
x− Ex[δ(τ
ε
S)XτεS ]
ε
≥ 0, ∀x ∈ S, (1.6)
where
τ εS = inf{t ≥ ε : Xt ∈ S}. (1.7)
Compared to (1.3), the first-order condition (1.6) does capture the deviation from stopping to
continuing. However, similar to that for time-inconsistent control (see e.g., [1, Remark 3.5] and
[9]), the first-order criterion does not correspond to the equilibrium concept perfectly: when the
limit in (1.6) equals zero, it is possible that for all ε > 0, x < Ex[δ(τ
ε
S)XτεS ], in which case there is
an incentive to deviate.
To sum up, the economic interpretation of being “equilibrium” for mild and weak ones is inad-
equate. To resolve this issue, we introduce the following concept of strong equilibrium, which is
inspired by [9].
Definition 1.5. A measurable set S ⊂ X is said to be a strong equilibrium, if{
x ≤ Ex[δ(τS)XτS ], ∀x /∈ S,
∃ h(x) > 0, s.t. ∀ ε ∈ (0, h(x)), x ≥ Ex[δ(τ
ε
S)XτεS ], ∀x ∈ S. (1.8)
3Compared to (1.3) and (1.6), condition (1.8) not only captures the deviation from stopping to
continuing, but also more precisely indicates the disincentive of such deviation. Consequently, a
strong equilibrium delivers better economic meaning as being an “equilibrium”.
In this paper, when X is a Markov chain we show that an optimal mild equilibrium is a strong
equilibrium (see Theorem 2.1). (Obviously, a strong equilibrium is also weak, and a weak equilib-
rium is also mild.) We also provide examples showing that a strong equilibrium may not be an
optimal mild equilibrium, and a weak equilibrium may not be strong. Therefore, we thoroughly
obtain the relation between mild, weak, strong, and optimal mild (and thus optimal weak, optimal
strong) equilibria. Moreover, we provide a new iteration method which directly constructs an opti-
mal mild equilibrium and thus also establish its existence (see Thoerem 2.2). In [8, 7], an optimal
equilibrium is constructed by the intersection of all (mild) equilibriums. In principle, this requires
us to first find all (mild) equilibria in order to get the optimal one, which may not be implementable
in many cases. The new iteration method proposed in this paper is much easier and more efficient
to implement. It would be interesting to see whether such results can be extended to diffusion
models, which we will leave for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 collects the main results of the paper.
An optimal mild equilibrium is proved to be a strong equilibrium, and can be directly constructed
via a new iteration method. Section 3 focuses on a concrete two-state model, which demonstrates
the differences between these equilibria.
2. The Main Results
In this section, we apply the concepts in Section 1 to a continuous-time Markov chain and present
our main results under this setting. Let X = (Xt)t≥0 be a time-homogeneous continuous-time
Markov chain. It has a finite or countably infinite state space X ⊂ [0,∞). Let λx be the transition
rate out of the state x ∈ X, and qxy be the transition rate from state x to y for y 6= x. Then we
have that λx =
∑
y 6=x qxy. The discount function t 7→ δ(t) is assumed to be non-exponential and
decreasing, with δ(0) = 1 and limt→∞ δ(t) = 0. Let the filtration (Ft)t∈[0,∞) be generated by X.
Furthermore, we make the following assumptions on X and δ(·).
Assumption 2.1. (i) C := supX <∞ and λ := supx∈X λx <∞.
(ii) X is irreducible, i.e., for any x, y ∈ X, inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = y |X0 = x} <∞, a.s..
Assumption 2.2. (i) δ is log-subadditive, i.e.,
δ(s)δ(t) ≤ δ(s + t), ∀ s, t > 0. (2.1)
(ii) t 7→ δ(t) is differentiable at t = 0, and δ′(0) < 0.
Remark 2.1. Assumption 2.2 (i) is closely related to decreasing impatience in Behavioral Eco-
nomics and Finance and commonly used when studying non-exponential discounting problems; see
e.g., [8, 7, 4].
The following is the first main result of this paper, which shows that an optimal mild equilibrium
is a strong equilibrium. The proof is provided in Section 2.1.
Theorem 2.1. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. If S is an optimal mild equilibrium, then it is
a strong equilibrium.
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Since all mild equilibria are strong equilibria, an optimal mild equilibrium will generate larger
values than any strong equilibrium as well. With Theorem 2.1, we can conclude that any optimal
mild equilibrium is a strong equilibrium and in fact is an optimal strong equilibrium.
The following is the second main result of this paper. It provides an iteration method which
directly constructs an optimal mild equilibrium, and thus also establishes the existence of weak,
strong, and optimal mild equilibria. The proof of this result is presented in Section 2.2.
Theorem 2.2. Let S0 := ∅, and
Sn+1 := Sn ∪
{
x ∈ X \ Sn : x > sup
S:Sn⊂S⊂X\{x}
J(x, S)
}
. (2.2)
Let
S∞ := ∪
∞
n=0Sn. (2.3)
If Assumptions 2.1 (i) and 2.2 (i) hold, then S∞ is an optimal mild equilibrium. If in addition
Assumption 2.2 (ii) holds, then S∞ is a strong equilibrium.
2.1. Proof of Theorem 2.1. Recall τS , τ
ε
S , J(·, ·) defined in (1.4),(1.7),(1.5) respectively. We have
the following characterization of (1.6) in Definition 1.2.
Proposition 2.1. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 (ii) hold. Then S ⊂ X is a weak equilibrium if and
only if S is a mild equilibrium and for all x ∈ S,
x(λx − δ
′(0)) ≥
∑
y∈S\{x}
yqxy +
∑
y∈Sc
J(y, S)qxy.
Proof. By definition, we only need to check condition (1.6) in Definition 1.2 is equivalent to the
above inequality.
Denote Tx := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt 6= x,X0 = x} as the holding time at state x, which has exponential
distribution with parameter λx. Then
Ex[δ(τ
ε
S)XτεS ] = Ex[δ(τ
ε
S)XτεS1{Tx>ε}] +
∑
y∈X\{x}
Ex[δ(τ
ε
S)XτεS1{Tx≤ε,XTx=y,Ty+Tx>ε}] +O(ε
2)
= δ(ε)xe−λxε +
 ∑
y∈S\{x}
δ(ε)y
qxy
λx
+
∑
y∈Sc
Ey[δ(ε + τS)XτS ]
qxy
λx
 (λxε+O(ε2)) +O(ε2).
Notice that δ(ε) = 1 + δ′(0)ε +O(ε2). Therefore we have
Ex[δ(τ
ε
S)XτεS ] = x+
−x(λx − δ′(0)) + ∑
y∈S\{x}
yqxy +
∑
y∈Sc
qxyEy[δ(ε + τS)XτS ]
 ε+ o(ε).
Therefore, (1.6) is equivalent to
x(λx − δ
′(0)) ≥
∑
y∈S\{x}
yqxy +
∑
y∈Sc
Ey[δ(τS)XτS ]qxy.

Corollary 2.1. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 (ii) hold. If S is a mild equilibrium and satisfies
x(λx − δ
′(0)) >
∑
y∈S\{x}
yqxy +
∑
y∈Sc
Ey[δ(τS)XτS ]qxy,
5then it is a strong equilibrium.
For the rest of the paper, we will sometimes use the notation
ρ(x, S) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ∈ S}
in the place of τS to emphasize the initial state X0 = x (X
x here is the Markov chain starting at
x).
Lemma 2.1. Let Assumption 2.2 (i) hold. For x ∈ S, denote Sˆ = S\{x}. If S is an optimal mild
equilibrium, then for any y /∈ S,
J(y, Sˆ)− J(y, S) ≥ Ey[δ(τS)1{XτS=x}](J(x, Sˆ)− x).
Proof. Since Sˆ ⊂ S, we have ρ(y, S) ≤ ρ(y, Sˆ). Then
J(y, Sˆ)− J(y, S)
= Ey[δ(ρ(y, Sˆ))Xρ(y,Sˆ)1{Xρ(y,S)=x}] + Ey[δ(ρ(y, Sˆ))Xρ(y,Sˆ)1{Xρ(y,S)∈Sˆ}]− Ey[δ(ρ(y, S))Xρ(y,S) ]
= Ey[δ(ρ(y, Sˆ))Xρ(y,Sˆ)1{Xρ(y,S)=x}] + Ey[δ(ρ(y, S))Xρ(y,S)1{Xρ(y,S)∈Sˆ}]− Ey[δ(ρ(y, S))Xρ(y,S) ]
= Ey[δ(ρ(y, Sˆ))Xρ(y,Sˆ)1{Xρ(y,S)=x}]− xEy[δ(ρ(y, S))1{Xρ(y,S)=x}]
≥ Ey[δ(ρ(y, S))1{Xρ(y,S)=x}E[δ(ρ(y, Sˆ)− ρ(y, S))Xρ(x,Sˆ)|Fρ(y,S)]]− xEy[δ(ρ(y, S))1{Xρ(y,S)=x}]
= Ey[δ(τS)1{XτS=x}](Ex[δ(τSˆ)XτSˆ ]− x),
where we use (2.1) for the inequality above. 
Lemma 2.2. Let Assumption 2.2 (i) hold. If S is an optimal mild equilibrium, then for any x ∈ S
we have that
x ≥ J(x, Sˆ), where Sˆ = S\{x}.
As a result, 0 /∈ S and J(y, S) > 0 for all y ∈ X.
Proof. If Sˆ is also a mild equilibrium, then
x ≤ J(x, Sˆ) ≤ J(x, S) = x,
and thus x = J(x, Sˆ).
If Sˆ is not a mild equilibrium, then there exists y /∈ Sˆ such that J(y, Sˆ) < y ≤ J(y, S). By
Lemma 2.1,
0 > J(y, Sˆ)− J(y, S) ≥ Ey[δ(τS)I{XτS=x}](J(x, Sˆ)− x),
which implies that
x > J(x, Sˆ). (2.4)
Now suppose 0 ∈ S. By the above result, we have 0 ≥ J(0, S\{0}). Since XτS\{0} > 0,
J(0, S\{0}) > 0, which is a contraction. As a result, 0 /∈ S and J(y, S) > 0 for all y ∈ X. 
Proof of Theorem 2.1. By Assumption 2.2, δ(t) ≥ eδ
′(0)t for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, there exist
t0 > 0 such that for t > t0, δ(t) > e
δ′(0)t since δ is non-exponential. As a result, for any x ∈ X,
Ex[δ(Tx)] =
∫ ∞
0
δ(t)e−λxtdt >
∫ ∞
0
λxe
(δ′(0)−λx)tdt =
λx
λx − δ′(0)
.
Denote cx :=
λx
λx−δ′(0)
.
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If S = {x}, then ∑
y 6=x
J(y, S)qxy ≤ x
∑
x 6=y
Ey[δ(Ty)]qxy < xλx < x(λx − δ
′(0)),
which implies that S is a strong equilibrium.
For the rest of the proof, we assume S contains at least two points. Fix any x ∈ S, we have
J(x, Sˆ) =
∑
y∈S\{x}
qxy
λx
Ex[δ(τSˆ)XτSˆ |XTx = y] +
∑
y/∈S
qxy
λx
Ex[δ(τSˆ)XτSˆ |XTx = y].
Since for y ∈ S \ {x},
Ex[δ(τSˆ)XτSˆ |XTx = y] = yEx[δ(τSˆ)|XTx = y] = yEx[δ(Tx)|XTx = y] = yEx[δ(Tx)],
and for y ∈ Sc,
Ex[δ(τSˆ)XτSˆ |XTx = y] ≥ Ex[δ(Tx)δ(τSˆ − Tx)XτSˆ |XTx = y]
= Ex[δ(Tx)|XTx = y] · Ex[δ(τSˆ − Tx)XτSˆ |XTx = y] = Ex[δ(Tx)] · J(y, Sˆ),
we have that
J(x, Sˆ) ≥
 ∑
y∈S\{x}
qxy
λx
y +
∑
y/∈S
qxy
λx
J(y, Sˆ)
 · Ex[δ(Tx)]. (2.5)
Denote
I :=
∑
y∈S\{x}
qxy
λx
y, II :=
∑
y/∈S
qxy
λx
J(y, S), IˆI :=
∑
y/∈S
qxy
λx
J(y, Sˆ).
By Lemma 2.2, y > 0 for all y ∈ Sˆ and J(y, Sˆ) > 0 for all y /∈ Sˆ, thus I + IˆI > 0. This together
with Ex[δ(Tx)] > cx implies that
J(x, Sˆ) > (I + IˆI)cx.
Then
x− J(x, Sˆ) < x− (I + IˆI)cx
= x− (I + II)cx + (II− IˆI)cx
= x− (I + II)cx + cx
∑
y/∈S
qxy
λx
(J(y, S) − J(y, Sˆ))
≤ x− (I + II)cx + cx
∑
y/∈S
qxy
λx
(Ey[δ(τS)1{XτS=x}](x− J(x, Sˆ)),
where the last line follows from Lemma 2.1. Thus1− cx∑
y/∈S
qxy
λx
(Ey[δ(τS)1{XτS=x}])
 (x− J(x, Sˆ)) < x− (I + II)cx. (2.6)
Notice that
cx
∑
y/∈S
qxy
λx
(Ey[δ(τS)1{XτS=x}] ≤ cx
∑
y/∈S
qxy
λx
≤ cx < 1.
Then by Lemma 2.2,
x− (I + II)cx > 0, ∀x ∈ X,
which implies S is a strong equilibrium. 
72.2. Proof of Theorem 2.2. We start with the following lemma, which in particular indicates
that a smaller mild equilibrium generates larger values.
Lemma 2.3. Let Assumption 2.2 (i) hold. If S is a mild equilibrium, then for any subset R ⊂ X
with S ⊂ R, we have
J(x, S) ≥ J(x,R), ∀x ∈ X.
Proof. Since S ⊂ R, ρ(x, S) ≥ ρ(x,R) for all x ∈ X.
J(x, S) = Ex[δ(ρ(x, S))Xρ(x,S)]
= Ex[Ex[δ(ρ(x, S))Xρ(x,S) |Fρ(x,R)]]
≥ Ex[δ(ρ(x,R))Ex[δ(ρ(x, S) − ρ(x,R))Xρ(x,S)|Fρ(x,R)]]
= Ex[δ(ρ(x,R))EXρ(x,R) [δ(ρ(Xρ(x,R), S))Xρ(x,S)]]
≥ Ex[δ(ρ(x,R))Xρ(x,R) ] = J(x,R).
The last inequality holds because S is a mild equilibrium and by definition,
EXρ(x,R)[δ(ρ(Xρ(x,R) , S))Xρ(x,S)] ≥ Xρ(x,R).

Corollary 2.2. Let Assumption 2.2 (i) hold. If S is the smallest mild equilibrium, i.e. S ⊂ S˜ for
any mild equilibrium S˜, then S is an optimal mild equilibrium.
Thanks to this corollary, in order to show S∞ defined in (2.3) is an optimal mild equilibrium, it
suffices to show that S∞ is the smallest one.
Recall Sn defined in (2.2). We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. For any mild equilibrium R, we have that Sn ⊂ R for all n ∈ N.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction. First S0 ⊂ R. Suppose Sn ⊂ R for n ≥ 0. Since R is a
mild equilibrium, for any x /∈ R,
x ≤ J(x,R) ≤ sup
S:Sn⊂S⊂X\{x}
J(x, S).
Therefore x /∈ Sn+1. As a result, Sn+1 ⊂ R for all n ∈ N. 
Lemma 2.5. Let Assumption 2.1 (i) hold. For y /∈ S∞, denote
Vn := sup
S:Sn⊂S⊂X\{y}
J(y, S), V∞ := sup
S:S∞⊂S⊂X\{y}
J(y, S),
then we have Vn ց V∞, n→∞.
Proof. Since S∞ =
⋃
n≥1 Sn, we have ρ(y, S∞\Sn)→∞, n →∞. Then for any ε > 0, there exists
N = N(ε, y) such that for n > N , Ey[δ(τS∞\Sn)] < ε since limt→∞ δ(t) = 0.
For any Rn such that Sn ⊂ Rn ⊂ X\{y}, denote Rn := Rn
⋃
S∞, then we have,
J(y,Rn)− J(y,Rn) = Ey[(δ(τRn )XτRn − δ(τRn)XτRn )1{XτRn∈S∞\Rn}
]
≤ CEy[δ(τRn)1{Xτ
Rn
∈S∞\Rn}]
≤ CEy[δ(τS∞\Rn)1{Xτ
Rn
∈S∞\Rn}]
≤ Cε
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Since S∞ ⊂ Rn ⊂ X\{y}, by definition, J(y,Rn) ≤ V∞. Therefore we have that for any ε > 0,
there exists N such that for any n ≥ N ,
Vn = sup
Rn:Sn⊂Rn⊂X\{y}
J(y,Rn) ≤ V∞ + Cε.
Clearly Sn ⊂ Sn+1 implies that Vn is non-increasing and Vn ≥ V∞ for all n. This completes the
proof that Vn ց V∞, n→∞. 
Proof of Theorem 2.2. By Corollary 2.2 and Lemma 2.4, to show that S∞ is an optimal mild
equilibrium, it suffices to show S∞ is a mild equilibrium.
Suppose S∞ is not a mild equilibrium. Then
α := sup
x∈X
{x− J(x, S∞)} > 0.
For any ε > 0, there exists y /∈ S∞ such that y − J(y, S∞) ≥ α− ε. Since y /∈ Sn for all n ≥ 0, we
have
y ≤ sup
S:Sn⊂S⊂X\{y}
J(y, S), ∀n ≥ 0.
By Lemma 2.5,
y ≤ sup
S:S∞⊂S⊂X\{y}
J(y, S).
Thus, there exists subset R with S∞ ⊂ R ⊂ X\{y} such that
y ≤ J(y,R) + ε.
Then we have J(y,R)− J(y, S∞) ≥ y− ε+α− ε− y = α− 2ε. Since S∞ ⊂ R, ρ(y, S∞) ≥ ρ(y,R).
It follows that
J(y,R)− J(y, S∞) = Ey[δ(ρ(y,R))Xρ(y,R) ]− Ey[Ey[δ(ρ(y, S∞))Xρ(y,S∞)|Fρ(y,R)]]
≤ Ey[δ(ρ(y,R))Xρ(y,R) ]− Ey[δ(ρ(y,R))Ey [δ(ρ(y, S∞)− ρ(y,R))Xρ(y,S∞)|Fρ(y,R)]]
= Ey[δ(ρ(y,R))(Xρ(y,R) − EXρ(y,R)[δ(ρ(Xρ(y,R), S∞))Xρ(Xρ(y,R),S∞)])
≤ Ey[δ(ρ(y,R))]α
≤ Ey[δ(Ty)]α.
By Assumption 2.2 (i), λ = supx∈X λx <∞ and since y /∈ R, we have 0 < Ey[δ(Ty)] < c < 1 where
c =
∫∞
0 δ(t)λe
−λtdt. By choosing 0 < ε ≤ α(1−c)2 , we obtain a contradiction.
Next let us prove S∞ is a strong equilibrium. If X is irreducible, then S∞ is a strong equilibrium
by Theorem 2.1. In general, following the proof for Proposition 2.1, to show S∞ is a strong
equilibrium, it suffices to show that for any x ∈ S∞ with λx > 0,
x(λx − δ
′(0)) >
∑
y∈S∞\{x}
yqxy +
∑
y∈Sc∞
Ey[δ(τS)XτS ]qxy. (2.7)
Take x ∈ S∞ with λx > 0. Following the argument for (2.5), we have that
J(x, Sˆ∞) ≥
 ∑
y∈S∞\{x}
qxy
λx
y +
∑
y/∈S∞
qxy
λx
J(y, Sˆ∞)
 · Ex[δ(Tx)],
where Sˆ∞ = S∞ \ {x}. Using an argument similar to that for (2.6), we have that1− cx ∑
y/∈S∞
qxy
λx
(Ey[δ(τS∞)1{XτS∞=x}
])
 (x− J(x, Sˆ∞)) ≤ x− (I∞ + II∞)cx,
9where
I∞ :=
∑
y∈S∞\{x}
qxy
λx
y and II∞ :=
∑
y/∈S∞
qxy
λx
J(y, S∞).
Since S∞ is the smallest mild equilibrium, Sˆ∞ is not a mild equilibrium. Then x > J(x, Sˆ∞) by
(2.4). Therefore,
x− (I∞ + II∞)cx > 0,
which implies (2.7). 
3. A Two-state Example
In this section, we will use an example to illustrate that a mild equilibrium may not be a weak
equilibrium, a weak equilibrium may not be a strong equilibrium and a strong equilibrium may not
be an optimal mild equilibrium.
Consider a two-state continuous-time Markov chain Xt ∈ {a, b} for t ≥ 0. Assume a > 0, b > 0
and without loss of generality we assume a > b. The generator is
Q =
[
−λa λa
λb −λb
]
,
where λa > 0 and λb > 0.
There are four subsets of {a, b}. Clearly S = ∅ and S = {b} cannot be mild equilibria and
S = {a, b} is a mild equilibrium. Next, let’s check when S = {a} is a mild equilibrium.
By definition S = {a} is a mild equilibrium if and only if
b ≤ aEb[δ(Tb)] = a
∫ ∞
0
δ(t)λbe
−λbtdt.
Consider the following cases.
(i) If ba =
∫∞
0 δ(t)λbe
−λbtdt < 1, then both {a} and {a, b} are optimal mild equilibria and thus
both are strong equilibria.
(ii) If ba <
∫∞
0 δ(t)λbe
−λbtdt < 1, then {a} is the only optimal mild equilibrium, which is also a
strong equilibrium. But the mild equilibrium {a, b} may not be a weak equilibrium. For example,
when ba <
λb
λb−δ′(0)
< 1, the second condition for weak equilibrium is violated at state b, thus it is
not a weak equilibrium.
(iii) λaλa−δ′(0) < 1 <
a
b holds automatically since a > b and δ
′(0) < 0. If λbλb−δ′(0) <
b
a <∫∞
0 δ(t)λbe
−λbtdt < 1, then {a, b} is not an optimal mild equilibrium, but it is a weak equilibrium
and also a strong equilibrium.
(iv) If λbλb−δ′(0) =
b
a < 1, {a, b} is a weak equilibrium, but it may not be a strong equilibrium, i.e.
condition (1.8) on strong equilibrium may not hold at state b. This can be shown by computing
the related term of order ε2.
Since
P(Xε = a|X0 = b) = λbε−
λ2b + λaλb
2
ε2 + o(ε2),
and
P(Xε = b|X0 = b) = 1− λbε+
λ2b + λaλb
2
ε2 + o(ε2),
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we have b− Eb[δ(ε)Xε]
= b− δ(ε)[aP(Xε = a|X0 = b) + bP(Xε = b|X0 = b)]
= b− (1 + δ′(0)ε +
δ′′(0)
2
ε2 + o(ε2))[a(λbε−
λ2b + λaλb
2
ε2 + o(ε2)) + b(1− λbε+
λ2b + λaλb
2
ε2 + o(ε2))]
= (bλb − aλb − bδ
′(0))ε + [b(λbδ
′(0)−
λ2b + λaλb
2
−
δ′′(0)
2
)− a(δ′(0)λb −
λ2b + λaλb
2
)]ε2 + o(ε2)
Therefore when the first order term and the second order term respectively satisfy
b(λb − δ
′(0)) − aλb = 0, (3.1)
and
b(λbδ
′(0)−
λ2b + λaλb
2
−
δ′′(0)
2
)− a(δ′(0)λb −
λ2b + λaλb
2
) < 0, (3.2)
{a, b} is a weak equilibrium but not a strong equilibrium. Using (3.1), (3.2) can be simplified to
λa + λb <
δ′′(0)− 2(δ′(0)2)
−δ′(0)
. (3.3)
An interesting case is when δ(t) = 11+βt . Then (3.3) does not hold: δ
′(0) = −β and δ′′(0) = 2β2.
In this case δ
′′(0)−2(δ′(0)2)
−δ′(0) = 0, which contradicts λa + λb > 0. That means if we have hyperbolic
discount function, a weak equilibrium is always a strong equilibrium in the two-state setting.
But when δ(t) = (1+βt)−
1
2 , then it can easily be seen that (3.3) holds: δ′(0) = −β2 , δ
′′(0) = 34β
2
implies that when 0 < λa + λb <
β
2 and
b
a =
2λb
2λb+β
, {a, b} is a weak equilibrium but not a strong
equilibrium. In this case, {a, b} is not an optimal mild equilibrium.
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